It is against this background that one should approach the topic of iconoclasm. The Jewish commandment that prohibits images of God is the obverse of the statement that relating to one's neighbour is the ONLY terrain of religious practice, of where the divine dimension is present in our lives. 'No images of God' does not point towards a gnostic experience of the divine beyond our reality, a divine which is beyond any image; on the contrary, it designates a kind of ethical hic Rhodus, hic salta: you want to be religious? OK, prove it HERE, in the 'works of love', in the way you relate to your neighbours…. Levinas was therefore right to emphasise how 'nothing is more opposed to a relation with the face than "contact" with the Irrational and mystery' (Levinas 1997 p. 9) . Judaism is anti-gnosticism par excellence. We have here a nice case of the Hegelian reversal of reflexive determination into determinate reflection: instead of saying 'God is love', we should say 'love is divine' (and, of course, the point is not to conceive of this reversal as the standard humanist platitude). It is for this precise reason that Christianity, far from standing for a regression towards an image of God, only draws the consequence of the Jewish iconoclasm through asserting the identity of God and man -or, as it is said in John 4:12: 'No man has ever seen God; if we love one another, God abides in us and his love is perfected in us'. The radical conclusion to be drawn from this is that one should renounce the very striving for one's own (spiritual) salvation as the highest form of egotism -according to Leon Brunschvicg, therein resides the most elementary ethical lesson of the West against the Eastern spirituality: 'The preoccupation with our salvation is a remnant of self-love, a trace of natural egocentrism from which we must be torn by the religious life. As long as you think only salvation, you turn your back on God. God is God, only for the person who overcomes the temptation to degrade Him and use Him for his own ends' (quoted in Levinas 1997 p. 48) .
So what about the Buddhist figure of bodhisattva who, out of love for the not-yet-enlightened suffering humanity, postpones his own salvation to help others on the way towards it? Does bodhisattva not stand for the highest contradiction: is not the implication of his gesture that love is higher than salvation? So why still call salvation salvation? And, what we find at the end of this road is atheism -not the ridiculously pathetic spectacle of the heroic defiance of God, but insight into the irrelevance of the divine, again, along the lines of Brecht's Herr Keuner: someone asked Herr Keuner if there is a God. Herr Keuner said: 'I advise you to think about how your behavior would change with regard to the answer to this question. If it would not change, then we can drop the question. If it would change, then I can help you at least insofar as I can tell you: You already decided: You need a God' (Brecht 1995 p. 18) .
Brecht is right here: we are never in a position to directly choose between theism and atheism, since the choice as such is located within the field of belief. 'Atheism' (in the sense of deciding not to believe in God) is a miserable pathetic stance of those who long for God but cannot find him (or who 'rebel against God'…). A true atheist does not choose atheism: for him, the question itself is irrelevant.
SMASHING THE OTHER'S FACE
How does subjectivity relate to transcendence? There seem to be two basic modes exemplified by the names of Sartre and Levinas: (1) either the 'transcendence of the ego' (Sartre), ie, the notion of the subject as the force of negativity, self-transcending, never a positive entity identical to itself; (2) or the existence of the subject as grounded in the openness to an irreducible-unfathomable-transcendent Otherness -there is a subject only insofar as it is not absolute, self-grounded, but remains in a tension with an impenetrable Other; there is freedom only through the reference to a gap which makes the Other unfathomable (according to Manfred Frank et al, this is what Hoelderlin, Novalis, Schelling, etc., knew in their critique of idealism). As expected, Hegel offers a kind of 'mediation' between these two extremes, asserting their ultimate identity (Hegel 1978) . It is not only that the core of subjectivity is inaccessible to the subject, that the subject is decentred with regard to itself, that it cannot assume the abyss in its very centre: it is also not that the first mode is the 'truth' of the second (in a reflexive twist, the subject has to acknowledge that the transcendent power which resists it is really its own, the power of the subject itself), or vice versa (the subject emerges only as confronted with the abyss of the Other). This effectively seems to be the lesson of Hegel's intersubjectivity -I am as a free subject only through encountering another free subject -and the usual counter-argument is here that, for Hegel, this dependence on the Other is just a mediating step/detour on the way towards full recognition of the subject in its Other, the full appropriation of the Other. But are things effectively so simple? What if the Hegelian 'recognition' means that I have to recognise in the impenetrable Other which appears as the obstacle to my freedom its positive-enabling ground and condition? What if it is ONLY in this sense is that the Other is 'sublated?'
The topic of the 'other' is to be submitted to a kind of spectral analysis that renders visible its imaginary, symbolic and real aspects -it provides perhaps the ultimate case of the Lacanian notion of the 'Borromean knot' that unites these three dimensions. First, there is the imaginary other -other people 'like me', my fellow human beings with whom I am engaged in the mirrorlike relationships of competition, mutual recognition, etc. Then, there is the symbolic 'big Other' -the 'substance' of our social existence, the impersonal set of rules that coordinate our coexistence. Finally, there is the Other qua Real, the impossible Thing, the 'inhuman partner', the Other with whom no symmetrical dialogue, mediated by the symbolic Order, is possible. And it is crucial to perceive how these three dimensions are hooked up. Essentially it is this unknown element in the alterity of the other which characterizes the speech relation on the level on which it is spoken to the other (Lacan 1981 p. 48) .
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Lacan's notion, from the early '50s, of the 'founding word', of the statement which confers on you a symbolic title and thus makes you what you are (wife, master), is usually perceived as an echo of the theory of performatif (the link between Lacan and Austin, the author of the notion of performatif, was Emile Benveniste). However, it is clear from the above quote that Lacan aims at something more: we need the recourse to performativity, to the symbolic engagement, precisely and only insofar as the other whom we encounter is not only the imaginary semblant, but also the elusive absolute Other of the Real Thing with whom no reciprocal exchange is possible. In order to render our co-existence with the Thing minimally bearable, the symbolic order qua Third, the pacifying mediator, has to intervene: the 'gentrification' of the Other-Thing into a 'normal human fellow' cannot occur through our direct interaction, but presupposes the third agency to which we both submit ourselves -there is no intersubjectivity (no symmetrical, shared, relation between humans) without the impersonal symbolic Order. So no axis between the two terms can subsist without the third one: if the functioning of the big Other is suspended, the friendly neighbour coincides with the monstrous Thing (Antigone); if there is no neighbour to whom I can relate as a human partner, the symbolic Order itself turns into the monstrous Thing which directly parasitises upon me (like Daniel Paul Schreber's God who directly controls me, penetrating me with the rays of jouissance): if there is no Thing to underpin our everyday symbolically regulated exchange with others, we find ourselves in a Habermasian 'flat' aseptic universe in which subjects are deprived of their hubris of excessive passion, reduced to lifeless pawns in the regulated game of communication. -And it is from here that one should approach the key Levinasian notion of encountering the other's face as the epiphany, as the event that precedes Truth itself: 'To seek truth, I have already established a relationship with a face which can guarantee itself, whose epiphany itself is somehow a word of honor. Every language as an exchange of verbal signs refers already to this primordial word of honor... deceit and veracity already presuppose the absolute authenticity of the face' (Levinas 1979 p. 202) .
One should read these lines against the background of the circular, self-referential, character of the Lacanian 'big Other', the symbolic 'substance' of our being, which is perhaps best rendered by Donald Davidson's 'holistic' claim that 'our only evidence for a belief is other beliefs... And since no belief is self-certifying, none can supply a certain basis for the rest' (Davidson 1986 p. 331) . Far from functioning as the 'fatal flaw' of the symbolic order, this circularity is the very condition of its effective functioning. So when Levinas claims that a face 'can guarantee itself', this means that, precisely, it serves as the non-linguistic point of reference which also enables us to break the vicious circularity of the symbolic order, providing it with the ultimate foundation, the 'absolute authenticity'. The face is thus the ultimate FETISH, the object which fills in (obfuscates) the big Other's 'castration' (inconsistency, lack), the abyss of its circularity. At a different level, this fetishisation -or, rather, fetishist disavowal -is discernible also in our daily relating to another person's face. This disavowal does not primarily concern the raw reality of flesh ('I know very well that beneath the face, there is just the Real of the raw flesh, bones and blood, but I nonetheless act as if face is a window into the mysterious interiority on the soul'), but rather, at a more radical level, the abyss/void of the Other: the human face 'gentrifies' the terrifying Thing that is the ultimate reality of our neighbour. And insofar as the void called 'the subject of the signifier' ($) is strictly correlative to this inconsistency (lack) of the Other, subject and face are to be opposed: the Event of encountering the other's face is not the experience of the abyss of the other's subjectivity -the only way to arrive at this experience is through defacement in all its dimensions, from a simple tic or grimace that disfigures the face (in this sense, Lacan claims that the Real is 'the grimace of reality'). Perhaps the key moment in Jerry Lewis's film occurs when the idiot he plays is compelled to become aware of the havoc his behaviour has caused: at this moment, when he is stared at by all the people around him, unable to sustain their gaze, he engages in his unique mode of making faces, of ridiculously disfiguring his facial expression, combined with twisting his hands and rolling his eyes. This desperate attempt of the ashamed subject to efface his presence, to erase himself from the other's view, combined with the endeavour to assume a new face more acceptable to the environs, is subjectivisation at its purest.
So what is shame, this experience of 'losing one's face'? In the standard Sartrean version, the subject, in his 'For-Itself', is ashamed of the 'In-itself', of the stupid Real of his bodily identity: am I really THAT, this bad smelling body, these nails, these excrements? In short, 'shame' designates the fact that 'spirit' is directly linked to the inert vulgar bodily reality -which is why it is shameful to defecate in public. However, Lacan's counter-argument is here that shame by definition concerns fantasy. Shame is not simply passivity, but an actively assumed passivity: if I am raped, I have nothing to be ashamed of; but if I enjoy being raped, then I deserve to feel ashamed. Actively assuming passivity thus means, in Lacanian terms, finding jouissance in the passive situation in which one is caught. And since the coordinates of jouissance are ultimately that of the fundamental fantasy, which is the fantasy of (finding jouissance in) being put in the passive position (like the Freudian 'My father is beating me'), what exposes the subject to shame is not the disclosure of how he is put in the passive position, treated only as the body: shame only emerges when such a passive position in social reality touches upon the (disavowed intimate) fantasy. Let us take two women, the first, liberated and assertive, active; the other, secretly daydreaming about being brutally handled by her partner, even raped. The crucial point is that, if both of them are raped, the rape will be much more traumatic for the second one, on account of the very fact that it will realise in 'external' social reality the 'stuff of her dreams'. Why? There is a gap which forever separates the fantasmatic kernel of the subject's being from the more 'superficial' modes of his or her symbolic and/or imaginary identifications -it is never possibly for me to fully assume (in the sense of symbolic integration) the fantasmatic kernel of my being: when I approach it too much, when I come too close to it, what occurs is the aphanisis of the subject: the subject loses his/her symbolic consistency, it disintegrates. And, perhaps, the forced actualisation in social reality itself of the fantasmatic kernel of my being is the worst, most humiliating kind of violence, a violence which undermines the very basis of my identity (of my 'selfimage') by exposing me to an unbearable shame.
We can clearly see, now, how far psychoanalysis is from any defence of the dignity of the human face: is the psychoanalytic treatment not the experience of rendering public (to the analyst who stands for the big Other) one's most intimate fantasies, and thus the experience of losing one's face in the most radical sense of the term? This is already the lesson of the very material dispositif of the psychoanalytic treatment: NO face to face between the subject-patient and the analyst, but the subject lying and the analyst sitting behind him, both staring in the same void in front of them. There is no 'intersubjectivity' here, only the two without face-to-face, the First and the Third… How, then, do the law, courts, judgements, institutions, etc., enter? Levinas's answer is: by way of the presence of the THIRD. When face to face with the other, I am infinitely responsible to him, this is the original ethical constellation; however, there is always a third one, and from ETHICAL VIOLENCE ARTICLE 02-6 that moment new questions arise: how does my neighbour whom I face relate to this Third? Is he the Third's friend or his foe or even his victim? Who, of the two, is my true neighbour in the first place? All this compels me to compare the infinites that cannot be compared, to limit the absolute priority of the other, to start to calculate the incalculable. However, what is important for Levinas is that this kind of legal relationship, necessary as it is, remains grounded in the primordial ethical relationship to the other.
1 The responsibility for the other -the subject as the response to the infinite call embodied in the other's face which is simultaneously helpless, vulnerable, and issuing an unconditional command -is for Levinas asymmetrical and non-reciprocal: I am responsible for the other without having any right to claim that the other should display the same responsibility for me. Levinas likes to quote Dostoyevsky here: 'We are all responsible for everything and guilty in front of everyone, but I am that more than all others' (Levinas 1997 p. 18) . The ethical asymmetry between me and the other addressing me with the infinite call is the primordial fact, and 'I' should never lose my grounding in this irreducibly first-person relationship to the other which should go to the extreme, if necessary -I should be ready to take responsibility for the other up to taking his place, up to becoming a hostage for him: 'Subjectivity as such is primordially a hostage, responsible to the extent that it becomes the sacrifice for others ' (p. 23) . This is how Levinas defines the 'reconciliatory sacrifice': a gesture by means of which the Same as the hostage takes the place of (replaces) the Other… Is, however, this gesture of 'reconciliatory sacrifice' not Christ's gesture par excellence? Was He not the hostage who took the place of all of us and as such is exemplarily human ('ecce homo')?
In his Ethics and Infinity, Levinas (1985) emphasises how what appears as the most natural should become the most questionable -like Spinoza's notion that every entity naturally strives for its self-perseverance, for the full assertion of its being and its immanent powers: do I have (the right) to be? Is it not that by insisting in being, I deprive others of their place, I ultimately kill them? (Although Levinas dismisses Freud as irrelevant for his radical ethical problematic, was Freud also in his own way not aware of it? Is 'death drive' at its most elementary not the sabotaging of one's own striving to be, to actualise one's powers-potentials? And is not for that very reason the death drive the last support of ethics?) What one should fully acknowledge and endorse is that this stance of Levinas is radically anti-biopolitical: the Levinasian ethics is the absolute opposite of today's biopolitics with its emphasis on regulating life and deploying its potentials -for Levinas, ethics is not about life, but about something MORE than life. It is at this level that Levinas locates the gap that separates Judaism and Christianity -Judaism's fundamental ethical task is that of how 'to be without being a murderer':
If Judaism is attached to the here below, it is not because it does not have the imagination to conceive of a supernatural order, or because matter represents some sort of absolute for it; but because the first light of conscience is lit for it on the path that leads from man to his neighbor. What is an individual, a solitary individual, if not a tree that grows without regard for everything it suppresses and breaks, grabbing all the nourishment, air and sun, a being that is fully jus- Attention to others and, consequently, the possibility of counting myself among them, of judging myself -conscience is justice (Levinas 1997 p. 100).
In contrast to this admission of terrestrial life as the very terrain of our ethical activity, Christianity simultaneously goes too far and not far enough: it believes that it is possible to overcome this horizon of finitude, to enter collectively a blessed state, to 'move mountains by faith' and realise a utopia, AND it immediately transposes the place of this blessed state into an Elsewhere, which then propels it to declare our terrestrial life of ultimately secondary importance and to reach a compromise with the masters of this world, giving to Caesar what belongs to Caesar. The link between spiritual salvation and worldly justice is cut short.
The determination of Judaism as the religion of the Law is to be taken literally: it is the Law at its purest, deprived of its obscene superego supplement. Recall the traditional obscene figure of the father who officially prohibits his son casual sex, while the message between the lines is to solicit him to engage in sexual conquests -prohibition is here uttered in order to provoke its transgression. And, with regard to this point, Paul was wrong in his description of the Law as that which solicits its own violation -wrong insofar as he attributed this notion of the Law to Jews: the miracle of the Jewish prohibition is that it effectively IS just a prohibition, with no obscene message between the lines. It is precisely because of this that Jews can look for the ways to get what they want while literally obeying the prohibition: far from displaying their casuistry and externally-manipulative relationship to the Law, this procedure rather bears witness to the direct and literal attachment to the Law. And it is in this sense that the position of the analyst is grounded in Judaism. Recall Henry James's 'The Lesson of the Master', in which Paul Overt, a young novelist, meets Henry St. George, his great literary master, who advises him to stay single, since a wife is not an inspiration but a hindrance. When Paul asks St. George if there are no women who would 'really understand -who can take part in a sacrifice', the answer he gets is: 'How can they take part? They themselves are the sacrifice. They're the idol and the altar and the flame' (chapter five). Paul follows St. George's advice and renounces the young Marian whom he passionately loves. However, after returning to London from a trip to Europe, Paul learns that, after the sudden death of his wife, St. George himself is about to marry Marian. After Paul accuses St. George of shameful conduct, the older man says that his advice was right: he will not write again, but Paul will achieve greatness… Far from displaying cynical wisdom, St. George acts as a true analyst: as the one who is not afraid to profit from his ethical choices, ie., as the one who is able to break the vicious cycle of ethics and sacrifice.
It is possible to break this vicious cycle precisely insofar as one escapes the hold of the superego injunction to enjoy. Traditionally, psychoanalysis was expected to allow the patient to overcome the obstacles which prevented him/her the access to 'normal' sexual enjoyment; today, however, when we are bombarded from all sides by the different versions of the superego-injunction 'Enjoy!', from direct enjoyment in sexual performance to enjoyment in professional achievement or in spiritual awakening, one should move to a more radical level: psychoanalysis is today the only discourse in which you are allowed NOT to enjoy (as opposed to 'not allowed to enjoy'). (And, from this vantage point, it becomes retroactively clear how already the traditional prohibition to enjoy was sustained by the implicit opposite injunction.) This notion of a Law which is not sustained by a superego supplement involves a radically new notion of society -a society no longer grounded in shared common roots:
Every word is an uprooting. The constitution of a real society is an uprooting -the end of an existence in which the 'being-at-home' is absolute, and everything comes from within. Paganism is putting down roots… The advent of the scriptures is not the subordination of the spirit to a letter, but the substitution of the letter to the soil. The spirit is free within the letter, and it is enslaved within the root. It is on the arid soil of the desert, where nothing is fixed, that the true spirit descended into a text in order to be universally fulfilled. Paganism is the local spirit: nationalism in terms of its cruelty and pitilessness… A humanity with roots that possesses God inwardly, with the sap rising from the earth, is a forest or prehuman humanity… A history in which the idea of a universal God must only be fulfilled requires a beginning. It requires an elite. It is not through pride that Israel feels it has been chosen. It has not obtained this through grace. Each time the peoples are judged, Israel is judged… It is because the universality of the Divine exists only in the form in which it is fulfilled in the relations between men, and because it must be fulfillment and expansion, that the category of a privileged civilization exists in the economy of Creation. This civilization is defined in terms not of prerogatives, but of responsibilities. Every person, as a person -that is to say, one conscious of his freedom -is chosen. If being chosen takes on a national appearance, it is because only in this form can a civilization be constituted, be maintained, be transmitted, and endure. (Levinas 1997 pp. 137-138 ).
However, is not the Jewish identity still the paradox of the being-uprooted itself functioning as the foundation of ethnic roots and identity?
2 Is not, consequently, the next step to be accomplished that of forming a collective which no longer relies on an ethnic identity, but is in its very core the collective of a struggling universality? Levinas is right in locating Jewish universalism in their very non-proselyte stance: Jews do not try to convert all others to Judaism, to impose their particular religious form onto all others, they just stubbornly cling to this form. The true universalism is thus paradoxically this very rejection to impose one's message on all others -in such a way, the wealth of the particular content in which the universal consists is asserted, all others are left to be in their particular ways of life. However, this stance nonetheless involves its own limitation: it reserves for itself a privileged position of a singularity with a direct access to the universal -all people participate in the universality, but Jews are 'more universal than others': 'The Jewish faith involves tolerance because, from the beginning, it bears the entire weight of all other men' (Levinas 1997 p. 173) . The Jewish man's burden… What is still missing here is the notion (and practice) of antagonistic universality, of the universality as struggle which cuts across the entire social body, of universality as a partial engaged position. Levinas fails to include into the scope of 'human' is rather the INHUMAN itself, a dimension which eludes the face-to-face relationship of humans.
JEWS, CHRISTIANS, AND OTHER MONSTERS
In a properly dialectical paradox, what is missing in Levinas, with all his celebration of the Otherness, is not some underlying Sameness of all humans but the radical, 'inhuman', Otherness itself: the Otherness of a human being reduced to inhumanity, the Otherness exemplified by the terrifying figure of Musulmannen, 'living dead', in the concentration camps. Which is why, although Levinas is often perceived as the thinker who endeavoured to articulate the experience of shoah, one thing is self-evident apropos his questioning of one's own right to be and his emphasis on my unconditional asymmetrical responsibility: this is not how a survivor of the shoah, how one who effectively experienced the ethical abyss of shoah, thinks and writes. This is how those think who feel guilty for observing the catastrophe from a minimal safe distance. 4 For this same reason, Levinas is also unable to take the (properly Christian) path of ethical paradoxes (of the 'teleological suspension of the ethical') outlined by Kierkegaard. In 'The Ancient Tragical Motif as Reflected in the Modern', a chapter of Volume I of Either/Or, Kierkegaard (1959) proposed his fantasy of what a modern Antigone would have been. The conflict is now entirely internalised; there is no longer a need for Creon. While Antigone admires and loves her father Oedipus, the public hero and saviour of Thebes, she knows the truth about him (murder of the father, incestuous marriage). Her deadlock is that she is prevented from sharing this accursed knowledge (like Abraham who also could not communicate to others the divine injunction to sacrifice his son): she cannot complain, share her pain and sorrow with others. In contrast to Sophocles's Antigone who acts (buries her brother and thus actively assumes her fate), she is unable to act, condemned forever to impassive suffering. This unbearable burden of her secret, of her destructive agalma, finally drives her to death in which only she can find peace otherwise provided by symbolizing/sharing one's pain and sorrow. And Kierkegaard's point is that this situation is no longer properly tragic (again, in a similar way that Abraham is also not a tragic figure) .
5 Furthermore, insofar as Kierkegaard's Antigone is a paradigmatically modernist one, one should go on with his mental experiment and imagine a postmodern Antigone with, of course, a Stalinist twist to her image: in contrast to the modernist one, she should find herself in a position in which, to quote Kierkegaard himself, the ethical itself would be the temptation. One version would undoubtedly be for Antigone to publicly renounce, denounce and accuse her father (or, in a different version, her brother Polynices) of his terrible sins OUT OF HER UNCONDITIONAL LOVE FOR HIM. The Kierkegaardian catch is that such a PUBLIC act would render Antigone even more ISOLATED, absolutely alone: no one -with the exception of Oedipus himself, if he were still alive -would understand that her act of betrayal is the supreme act of love…. Antigone would thus be entirely deprived of her sublime beauty -all that would signal the fact that she is not a pure and simple traitor to her father, but that she did it out of love for him, would be some barely perceptible repulsive tic, like the hysteric twitch of lips of Claudel's Sygne de Coufontaine. The more standard answer to Levinas's ethic of radical responsibility would have been that one can truly love others only if one loves oneself. However, at a more radical level, is there not something inherently FALSE in such a link between the responsibility for/to the other and questioning one's own right to exist? Although Levinas asserts this asymmetry as universal (everyone of us is in the position of primordial responsibility towards others), does this asymmetry not effectively end up in privileging ONE particular group which assumes responsibility for all others, which embodies in a privileged way this responsibility, directly stands for it -in this case, of course, Jews, so that, again, one is ironically tempted to speak of the 'Jewish man's (ethical) burden'?
The idea of a chosen people must not be taken as a sign of pride. It does not involve being aware of exceptional rights, but of exceptional duties. It is the prerogative of a moral consciousness itself. It knows itself at the centre of the world and for it the world is not homogeneous: for I am always alone in being able to answer the call, I am irreplaceable in my assumption of responsibility (Levinas 1997 pp. 176-177) .
In other words, do we not get here -in a homology with Marx's forms of the expression of value -a necessary passage from the simple and developed form (I am responsible for you, for all of you) to the general equivalent and then its reversal (I am the privileged site of responsibility for all of you, which is why you are all effectively responsible to me...)? And is this not the 'truth' of such an ethical stance, thereby confirming the old Hegelian suspicion that every self-denigration secretly asserts its contrary? It is like the proverbial excessive Political Correctness of the Western white male who questions his own right to assert his cultural identity, while celebrating the exotic identity of others, thereby asserting his privileged status of the universal-neutral medium of recognizing other's identities... Self-questioning is always by definition the obverse of selfprivileging; there is always something false about respect for others which is based on questioning one's own right to exist.
A Spinozean answer to Levinas would have been that our existence is not at the expense of others, but as part of the network of reality: there is, for Spinoza, no Hobbesian 'Self' as extracted from and opposed to reality -Spinoza's ontology is the one of full immanence to the world, ie., I 'am' just the network of my relations with the world, I am totally 'externalised' in it. My conatus, my tendency to assert myself, is thus not my assertion at the expense of the world, but my full acceptance of being part of the world, my assertion of the wider reality within which I can only thrive. The opposition of egotism and altruism is thus overcome: I fully am not as an isolated Self, but in the thriving reality part of which I am.
Levinas therefore secretly imputes to Spinoza an egotistic 'subjectivist' notion of (my) existence -his anti-Spinozean questioning of my right to exist is inverted arrogance,as if I am the centre whose existence threatens all others. So the answer should not be an assertion of my right to exist in harmony with and tolerance of others, but a more radical claim: do I exist in the first place? Am I not, rather, a hole in the order of being? This brings us to the ultimate paradox on account of which Levinas's answer is not sufficient: I am a threat to the entire order of being not insofar as I positively exist as part of this order, but precisely insofar as I am a hole in the order of being. As such, as nothing, I 'am' a striving to reach out and appropriate all: only a Nothing can desire to become Everything (it was already Schelling who defined the subject as the endless striving of the Nothing to become Everything). On the contrary, a positive living being occupying a determinate space in reality, rooted in it, is by definition a moment of its circulation and reproduction.
Recall the similar paradox of what structures the Politically Correct landscape: people far from the Western world are allowed to fully assert their particular ethnic identity without being proclaimed essentialist racist identitarians (native Americans, blacks…); the closer one gets to
